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Accident: Endeavor CRJ9 at Toronto on Feb 17th 2025, flipped over on landing
By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Feb 17th 2025 21:39Z, last updated Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 13:10Z

An Endeavor Airlines Canadair CRJ-900 on behalf of Delta Airlines, registration N932XJ performing flight DL-4819 from Minneapolis,MN (USA) to Toronto,ON (Canada) with 76 passengers and 4 crew, landed on Toronto's runway 23 at 14:12L (19:12Z) but came to a stop on the runway inverted, both wings, both main gear and the tailplane separated from the airframe. There were no fatalities, however, one person was critically injured, 7 others received minor injuries.

Toronto Airport reported all people on board have been accounted for.

Emergency services reported one person is in critical condition, 7 others have received injuries.

The Canadian TSB reported: "TSBAir is deploying a team to investigate an aircraft accident at Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport, ON. The TSB will gather information and assess the occurrence."

The NTSB reported: "The NTSB is leading a team of U.S. investigators to assist the Transportation Safety Board of Canada with their investigation of today’s accident of a Delta Air Lines Bombardier CRJ900 at Toronto Pearson International Airport. Per international protocols under the International Civil Aviation Organization's Annex 13, any information about the investigation will be released by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada."

On Feb 18th 2025 the TSB reported the aircraft impacted the runway causing parts of the aircraft to separate from the aircraft and the aircraft to turn upside down. The aircraft came to rest right of the runway. CVR and FDR have already been removed from the aircraft and have been sent to the laboratory.

On Mar 6th 2025 the TSB reported: "During the landing on Runway 23, the aircraft impacted the runway, the right wing detached and a fire ensued. The aircraft overturned, and slid down the runway inverted, coming to rest near the intersection of Runway 23 and 15L."

On Mar 18th 2025 the TSB announced: "Tomorrow (Mar 20th 2025) the TSB will be releasing a preliminary report into the Toronto Pearson airport’s Delta occurrence (A25O0021). "

On Mar 19th 2025 the TSB released their preliminary report and a video (see below) summarizing the sequence of events:

At 12471 on 17 February 2025, the MHI RJ Aviation Group. CL-600-2D24 aircraft (CRJ 900LR) operated by Endeavor Air (doing business as Delta Connection) departed Minneapolis-St. Paul International/Wold-Chamberlain Airport (KMSP), Minnesota, United States, on flight EDV4819, an instrument flight rules flight to Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ), Ontario, with 2 flight crew members, 2 cabin crew members, and 76 passengers on board. The captain was seated in the left seat and was the pilot monitoring for the flight. The first officer was seated in the right seat and was the pilot flying (PF).

The flight proceeded uneventfully, and the crew received clearance for the instrument landing system approach to Runway 23 at CYYZ. The landing reference speed (VREF) for the approach was 139 knots.

According to Endeavor Air’s CRJ700/900 Series Company Flight Manual, “Final approach is flown at VREF+5 knots. When operating in gusty wind conditions, increase VREF by 1/2 of the gust factor not to exceed 10 KIAS [knots indicated airspeed] (top of the bug).”2 On the occurrence flight, the flight crew set the speed bug to VREF+5 knots, or 144 knots. Given the reported wind gusts, the approach was flown at 149 knots.

At 1412:01, the aircraft descended through 500 feet above ground level (AGL). The aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 150 knots, its ground speed was 121 knots, and the engine thrust was indicating approximately 64% N1.3 The rate of descent was 720 fpm, and the localizer and glide slope were centred. Five seconds later, the PF disconnected the autopilot.

At 1412:26, while the aircraft was descending through 175 feet AGL, its indicated airspeed was 144 knots, with a ground speed of 121 knots, and a rate of descent of 672 fpm. The thrust remained at approximately 64% N1.

At 1412:30, while the aircraft was descending through 153 feet AGL, its indicated airspeed increased to 154 knots whereas the ground speed did not change appreciably, consistent with a performanceincreasing wind gust. The PF pulled back the thrust levers, and as a result, over the following 5 seconds, N1 decreased from 64% to approximately 43%, where it remained until touchdown. The airspeed began to decrease.

At 1412:40 (3.6 seconds before touchdown), when the aircraft was at a height of 50 feet AGL, the indicated airspeed was 145 knots, and the ground speed was 112 knots. The rate of descent had increased to 1114 fpm. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) aural alert “fifty” sounded to indicate the aircraft was at 50 feet AGL, which is a standard callout.

One second later (2.6 seconds before touchdown), the EGPWS alert “sink rate” sounded, indicating a high rate of descent. The aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 136 knots, its ground speed was 111 knots, and the rate of descent had remained at about 1100 fpm. The bank angle increased to a 4.7° right bank. The engine thrust was steady at approximately 43% N1.

At 1412:42 (1.6 seconds before touchdown), the aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 136 knots, and its ground speed was 111 knots. The aircraft was slightly below the glide slope, but on the visual segment of the approach and tracking the runway centreline. The rate of descent had increased to 1072 fpm, and the bank angle was 5.9° to the right.

Less than 1 second before touchdown, the aircraft’s indicated airspeed was 134 knots, and its ground speed was 111 knots. The bank angle was 7.1° to the right, and the pitch attitude was 1° nose up. The rate of descent was recorded as 1110 fpm.

At 1412:43.6, the right main landing gear (MLG) contacted the runway. The aircraft was in a 7.5° bank to the right with 1° of nose-up pitch and 3g vertical acceleration, at a rate of descent of approximately 1098 fpm (18.3 fps).

At touchdown, the following occurred: the side-stay that is attached to the right MLG fractured, the landing gear folded into the retracted position, the wing root fractured between the fuselage and the landing gear, and the wing detached from the fuselage, releasing a cloud of jet fuel, which caught fire. The exact sequence of these events is still to be determined by further examination of the fracture surfaces.

The aircraft then began to slide along the runway. The fuselage slid down Runway 23, rolling to the right until it became inverted. A large portion of the tail, including most of the vertical stabilizer and the entire horizontal stabilizer, became detached during the roll.

The aircraft went off the right side of the runway into the snow-covered grass area and came to a rest on Runway 15L, near the intersection with Runway 23, about 75 feet beyond the right edge of Runway 23 (Figure 1). The right wing, including the right MLG, became fully detached from the aircraft and slid approximately 215 feet further along Runway 23.

Once the aircraft came to a stop, an evacuation began. All occupants evacuated the aircraft. At the time of writing this preliminary report, it has been confirmed that 21 of the 80 occupants were injured; 2 of those occupants were reported to have serious injuries.


Related NOTAMs:
S0930/25 NOTAMR S0928/25
Q) CZYZ/QFAXX/IV/NBO/A/000/999/4341N07938W005
A) CYYZ PART 1 OF 4 B) 2502171907 C) 2502180307
E) RSC 05 5/5/5 10 PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10
PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10 PCT COMPACTED
SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW. 160FT WIDTH. REMAINING WIDTH
1/4IN DRY SNOW ON TOP OF COMPACTED SNOW. BLOWING SNOW. CHEMICAL
RESIDUE PRESENT. VALID FEB 17 1750 - FEB 18 0150.
RSC 23 5/5/5 10 PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10
PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10 PCT COMPACTED
SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW. 160FT WIDTH. REMAINING WIDTH
1/4IN DRY SNOW ON TOP OF COMPACTED SNOW. BLOWING SNOW. CHEMICAL
RESIDUE PRESENT. VALID FEB 17 1750 - FEB 18 0150.

S0932/25 NOTAMR S0930/25
Q) CZYZ/QFAXX/IV/NBO/A/000/999/4341N07938W005
A) CYYZ PART 1 OF 3 B) 2502171922 C) 2502180322
E) RSC 05 5/5/5 10 PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10
PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10 PCT COMPACTED
SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW. 160FT WIDTH. REMAINING WIDTH
1/4IN DRY SNOW ON TOP OF COMPACTED SNOW. BLOWING SNOW. CHEMICAL
RESIDUE PRESENT. VALID FEB 17 1750 - FEB 18 0150.
RSC 23 5/5/5 10 PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10
PCT COMPACTED SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW, 10 PCT COMPACTED
SNOW AND 25 PCT 1/8IN DRY SNOW. 160FT WIDTH. REMAINING WIDTH
1/4IN DRY SNOW ON TOP OF COMPACTED SNOW. BLOWING SNOW. CHEMICAL
RESIDUE PRESENT. VALID FEB 17 1750 - FEB 18 0150.

D0446/25 NOTAMN
Q) CZYZ/QMRLC/IV/NBO/A/000/999/4341N07938W005
A) CYYZ B) 2502171924 C) 2502181923
E) RWY 05/23 CLSD.

Metars:
CYYZ 172100Z 27026G34KT 10SM DRSN BKN040 M09/M15 A2996 RMK CU5 SLP159=
CYYZ 172000Z 27027G35KT 5SM BLSN BKN038 M08/M15 A2994 RMK CU5 VIS VRB 2-8 SLP153=
CYYZ 171932Z 27020G32KT 6SM R24L/2600VP6000FT/D BLSN BKN030 M08/M13 A2994 RMK CU5 ACCIDENT REPORT SLP151=
CYYZ 171900Z 27028G35KT 6SM R24L/3000VP6000FT/U BLSN BKN034 M09/M14 A2993 RMK CU6 SLP149=
CYYZ 171800Z 27028G34KT 6SM R33R/3000V5000FT/N R24L/5500V6000FT/U BLSN BKN038 M08/M14 A2992 RMK CF6 SLP146=
CYYZ 171700Z 27029G36KT 3SM R33L/3500VP6000FT/U R33R/2200V3000FT/N BLSN BKN033 M08/M13 A2991 RMK CF5 SLP141=
CYYZ 171600Z 26025G35KT 5SM R33R/4500V6000FT/U BLSN BKN030 M07/M12 A2990 RMK CF5 SLP137=
CYYZ 171522Z 26019G26KT 3SM -SHSN DRSN BKN020 M08/M11 A2989 RMK CF6 SLP136=
CYYZ 171500Z 27020G27KT 15SM DRSN BKN030 M07/M13 A2989 RMK CF5 SLP135=
CYYZ 171400Z 31006KT 15SM FEW020 FEW040 M10/M13 A2988 RMK CF1SC1 SC TR SLP133=

TSB Update of Mar 20th 2025 (Video: TSB):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChuQOwTV4LQ


Ground observer video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suhU3pGpFa0


Ground video showing short final and accident (Video: TMZ):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLKbrL7KFNY


Passenger video after exiting the inverted aircraft (Video: CP24):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7M7feunCYs


The aircraft on its back:
The aircraft on its back

Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth)


Reader Comments: (the comments posted below do not reflect the view of The Aviation Herald but represent the view of the various posters)
FAR 25.473
By HotelTango on Wednesday, Mar 26th 2025 12:08Z

I am interested in the certification process of the CRJ9. Acc. CFR Part 25 the aircraft should be able to sustain a descent rat of 10 fps without structural damage, and heavier landings may include damaging the landing gear, but without a landing gear failure damaging the wing structure (the MD11 being notorious, however old 'DC10' certification requirements). In which attitude was this 10 fps established: wings level or one wing down (normal landing attitude during crosswind conditions) and possibly even a slight crab? Energy dissipation by one or two main gears matters.

Also interesting to consider is whether or not the SINK RATE warning should activate at less than 1100 fpm if the aircraft apparently breaks up at this sink rate.

Thrust levers at idle below 150 feet in these conditions does raise some eyebrows here as well.

@juwin
By 787Capt on Monday, Mar 24th 2025 11:55Z

Beg to differ. Speed should have been vref plus 10 knots. Thats maximum in these winds. The CRJ needs the speed/energy for yoke movements to have an effect. Vertical speed was too high on approach. Which should have resulted in go around. They had about 10 seconds to do this. Cutting throttles to idle at 150 feet made the situation even worse. Can’t do this on the RJ in these conditions. Cut at 30 feet or less. Winds were terrible in the city that day.

This screamed go around. I hope the crew recover from this. When in ANY doubt go around.


By Juwin on Saturday, Mar 22nd 2025 09:01Z

The only problem here is no flare. Speed 5 kt below Vref during touchdown is perfectly normal. It's quite common for new pilots to not to flare while concentrating on decrab.


By (anonymous) on Friday, Mar 21st 2025 18:51Z

Good to see the Preliminary Report, and some sensible responses, but tiresome to read (again) the personal bickering and insults, especially directed at Canadian TSB methodology. They are professional investigators doing their job.

Fortunately, no country ever does everything exactly the same as any other - how boring would that be?






investigation basic
By Jetman on Friday, Mar 21st 2025 08:39Z

Basic to wait for the final report conclusion after complete investigation been carried out to understand the wing separation cause....
ie, we may then understand if Hard impact and banking leading the MLG to be in retract position and caused the wing tip to touch the ground without breaking have created additional lever arm force on the wing root fuselage that led to separation.
As always, we can not make a conclusion based only on history, waiting the final investigation report that provide analysis after gathering all the evidence and findings of the specific event, is a basic knowledge in aviation culture.

CVR
By Skydriver on Friday, Mar 21st 2025 08:25Z

@By Lee
You are right, what is "spoken" on the CVR will remain among the crew and the safety board.


too little thrust
By gasman on Friday, Mar 21st 2025 02:06Z

So they flew into a gust, decreased thrust a bit too much, IAS and GS both decreased by ~10 knots (as desired) and VS increased by ~450 fpm (not desired).

When the gust stopped, the IAS decreased by another 10 knots while the GS (and now too high VS) remained unchanged, but they didn't increase thrust again.

At a constant AoA (and configuration) thrust controls VS.

KIAS/GS/VS
150/121/720
144/121/672
154/121/... ; N1 64% > 43%
145/112/1114; EGPWS "fifty"
136/111/1100; EGPWS "sink rate"
136/111/1072
134/111/1110


By TheMightyQ on Friday, Mar 21st 2025 00:20Z

Disappointed there is no intel on the position of the thrust levers. I remember from my time flying the RJ that the engines took a few seconds to spool up and there was no increase in lift during that time, so we all knew that if you hit windshear at the wrong time you were just along to witness the crash. To be fair, on larger jets the engines take even longer to spool up but then that’s why they have the trailing link gear.

OddManOu
By (anonymous) on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 19:39Z

Try not to be disappointed. This is standard for most Canadian accident investigations.

Mathematically challenged?
By Dave K on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 19:12Z

"2.6 seconds before touchdown... ...the rate of descent had remained at about 1100 fpm"

"1.6 seconds before touchdown... ...The rate of descent had increased to 1072 fpm"

??

Metallurgy Correction
By Durb on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 17:03Z

Correction: Page 11

CVR in canada
By Lee on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 16:57Z

ive been wrong before (like, today), but my understanding is that CVR transcripts are not released in Canada due to privacy rules.

Apparently section 28 of Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act prevents them from releasing recordings or transcripts (although they have provided small clips in the past).

Metallurgy Photo
By Durb on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 16:55Z

If you follow the link to the TSB report, there is a closeup photo on page 7 of the outboard side strut where the fracture originated. There is discoloration that could have been caused post-incident, but could also be indicative of metallurgic abscesses inside that critical component. Probable cause will likely be multi-faceted.

Bank Angle
By Utah on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 16:48Z

It looked like the bank angle was increasing as the aircraft was just above the runway, so maybe the roll rate with the high sink rate landing combined to over stress the main gear. I agree with others though that this only tells part of the story and the CVR would help a lot.

eat crow
By Lee on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 16:26Z

Yes, I will now eat crow - this was completely unexpected, from the TSB - but well done them for moving into the modern age.

Having said that, my statement from Feb:

-----------------------------------------------
By Lee on Wednesday, Feb 19th 2025 16:03Z

i've been in the industry a long time, a couple of observations here:

- ive seen harder landings than this, without ripping an entire wing off, not sure if this a CRJ thing? (the wing box is one of the strongest structures on the hull)
----------------------------------------------

3g landings should not rip off a) MLG, and b) wing. Collapse, perhaps (to deform and absorb energy)

We have seen plenty of these on AVH, some even 4+ g on other airlines, without wings being ripped off.

This RJ has a structural flaw or else, was flying around, damaged and this firm landing finished it off.

Froze
By Milan on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 15:24Z

The preliminary factual report tells the story. Unstable approach. High rate of descent, continuous low thrust. Speed below the approach speed. 3 criteria mandating a go around. Let’s say the pilot flying “froze”. What was the role of the pilot monitoring? Anytime an approach becomes unstable below 500’ his job is to call for a go around. This is not a one man show. The next level will be to check the stabilized approach policy implementation in this company, aircrew technical training and CRM training.
If you hit the runway with high rate of descent, high G and with a bank, eventually your landing gear will collapse. And, no, wings are not designed to shear on impact, but they will, depends on the force and direction of the blow.


By MichaelE on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 15:08Z

A 3G landing is hard, but should main landing gear be able to withstand it, or would it be only if both mains took the load?

No CVR Info
By OddManOut on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 15:03Z

I am disappointed the TSB chose to not release any of the CVR transcript.

Sink Rate
By Mike on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 13:41Z

If a GPWS calls Sink Rate, it is GO Around. Approach is not stable.

PF was not controlling descent using thrust. A flare would have resulted in very low energy and a higher rate of descend.

Botched by PF and PM.



@Lee
By JTower on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 13:41Z

Time to eat crow?


By Jan Keller on Thursday, Mar 20th 2025 13:24Z

After Reading the prel. report: no change of pitch, constant ROD - no flare initiated

Not Both wings
By Norbert on Wednesday, Mar 19th 2025 19:41Z

I read that left Wing remained


By Lee on Wednesday, Mar 19th 2025 18:40Z

Prove me wrong tsb, release fdr and other factual data that isn't already in the news. You've never been able to do this before, now would be a good time.

Surprised
By BobLoblaw on Wednesday, Mar 19th 2025 16:56Z

A preliminary report this quickly from the Canadian TSB is a pleasant surprise; normally it seems to take them much longer. Hopefully it’ll have some usable information in it.

ICAO Reporting and TSB
By (anonymous) on Wednesday, Mar 12th 2025 19:34Z

I think something important to add is the below from ICAOs FAQ on investigations. It outlines that nothing has to be stated publicly initially. The state can decide what do to. And as others have mentioned; TSB has not posted anything new to their official accident investigation (A25O0021) since February.

From ICAO - What are a State’s reporting obligations during and after an aircraft accident investigation?

Under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, States in charge of an investigation must submit a Preliminary Report to ICAO within thirty days of the date of the accident, unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. Preliminary Reports may be marked as confidential or remain public at the investigating State’s discretion.

The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall also make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, if possible, within twelve months.



Landing gear information
By Kevin S on Wednesday, Mar 12th 2025 00:40Z

Not a big thing here. Just wanted to, perhaps, correct some text from the narrative.
Post incident, photos I have seen indicate that the left MLG is still on the aircraft.
That doesn’t change anything other than I wish to insert a correction.
Otherwise, we appreciate Simon’s diligence in maintaining a modicum of communication on this incident.

@ MARTY
By Lee on Tuesday, Mar 11th 2025 21:25Z

You are correct, nothing has been posted (and nothing will be posted) from the TSB until 12-16 months.

(from the TSB investigation page for this event)

News release
2025-02-19

Update: TSB Investigation into runway impact at Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport


Statement
2025-02-18

TSB statement following an aircraft accident at Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario


Deployment notice
2025-02-17

TSB is deploying a team of investigators following an aircraft accident at Toronto / Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario


By Marty on Monday, Mar 10th 2025 17:05Z

I haven’t been able to find the March 6 TSB report. The latest update on the official TSB investigation webpage appears to be from February 19, and the most recent post from TSB Canada related to the accident was on February 21. Am I overlooking any official source?


By (anonymous) on Sunday, Mar 9th 2025 22:14Z

wow NTSB very nice.

Obvious
By (anonymous) on Sunday, Mar 9th 2025 21:54Z

So the TSB just stated the very, very obvious.

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